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How Large Are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition? 
Ian W.H. Parry 
Abstract 
Previous literature has shown that competition among regional governments may lead to 
inefficiently low levels of capital taxation, because governments do not take account of the external 
benefits of capital flight to other regions. However, the fiscal distortion is smaller the more elastic the 
supply of capital (for the region bloc), if governments are not perfectly competitive, or they behave in part 
as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan.  
There has been very little empirical work on the magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal 
competition. This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects using a model that 
incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony power 
in factor markets, and a wide range of capital supply elasticities. The welfare costs of tax competition are 
generally fairly small, and even these costs can disappear fairly quickly when some weight is attached to 
the possibility of Leviathan behavior. 
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 1 
How Large Are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition? 
 
Ian W.H. Parry 
1. Introduction  
There is a large theoretical literature on the welfare implications of fiscal competition 
between governments of different regions, such as states within the United States, provinces 
within Canada, or countries within the European Union (EU).1 A key theme of this literature is 
that taxes on mobile factors such as capital, and hence overall public spending, may be 
inefficiently low due to a fiscal externality. When an individual government chooses its capital 
tax, it does not take account of the efficiency gains to other regions within a bloc from the 
resulting flight of capital out of its region, and thus the local cost to individual regions of higher 
taxes exceeds the social cost for the region bloc (Wildasin 1989; Wilson 1984; Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski 1986). Put another way, to the extent that reducing capital taxes in one region 
attracts capital from neighboring regions, the local incentives for lower taxes are socially 
excessive.  
In principle, this externality may provide a justification for a system of subsidies from 
some central authority to the regional governments, although when regions are heterogeneous, 
the corrective measure is a fairly complicated one that requires a different subsidy rate for each 
region (e.g., DePater and Myers 1994; Wildasin 1984).2 This approach may not be feasible in the 
EU because the budget of the European Commission is only around 2% of GDP (Commission of 
the European Communities 1993). Instead, the European Commission is considering imposing 
minimum rates of corporation income tax and other capital taxes across the EU.3  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Wilson 1999 for a comprehensive review. 
2 In the United States, Canada, and Australia the central government does provide extensive subsidies for regional 
governments. See Rounds 1992 for a detailed comparison of these countries. 
3 Currently, the EU imposes a minimum rate of value-added tax (17.5%) and a minimum rate of gasoline tax 
(although the latter is currently too low to be binding). Tax harmonization is a second-best response to the fiscal 
externality because it imposes the same rate of taxation across regions the optimum amount of government 
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However, in theory several factors may dampen the severity of the fiscal externality 
problem. First, at the region bloc level, the supply elasticity of capital may be non-zero. Thus, as 
higher taxes across regions within the bloc depress the net of tax return on capital, there might be 
a reduction in savings or capital flight outside the bloc. These effects limit the socially optimal 
size of the public sector for regions in the bloc.4 Second, individual regions may be large enough 
to have some monopsony power in the capital market. To the extent that an individual region 
faces an upward sloping, rather than flat, supply curve for capital, this will limit capital flight out 
of that region and work against the fiscal externality (e.g., Hoyt 1991). Third, regional 
governments may act strategically by anticipating some reaction from neighboring regions in 
response to their own tax changes. For example, the local incentives to reduce taxes are modified 
somewhat if a regional government anticipates that other governments may also cut taxes in 
response.  
Moreover, it is also possible that tax competition is desirable, because it curbs excessive 
government spending and taxation, rather than undesirable because it results in an inefficiently small 
public sector. This can be the case if government behavior is in part driven by the revenue-maximizing 
behavior of bureaucrats, or by the interplay of interest groups, rather than by a desire to maximize social 
welfare or satisfy the median voter (Brennan and Buchanen 1980; Edwards and Keen 1996; McGuire 
1999; Rauscher 1998; and Sinn 1992). Thus, the theoretical literature is ambiguous as to whether the 
public sector is actually too small or too large, and whether there is a case for policies to increase the size 
of government (e.g., subsidies from a central authority, minimum tax laws), or for policies to reduce the 
size of government (e.g., California’s Proposition 13, which limits the rate and base of property taxes). 
Very little work has been done on the empirical magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal 
competition. For example, Oates writes: “We are badly in need of empirical studies that can shed 
some light on the likely magnitude of the welfare losses resulting from fiscal competition” 
(1999, p. 10). Clearly, we need to be confident that, under reasonable assumptions about 
underlying parameter values, taxes are too low and that the resulting welfare losses are 
empirically “significant” in magnitude, in order to make an economic case for measures to 
expand the size of the public sector. If the welfare costs are empirically small, there is not much 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Boadway and Wildasin 1984 and Kotlikoff 1984 for some discussion of these issues.  Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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to gain on efficiency grounds from minimum tax rates, and if there are significant welfare costs 
because the public sector is initially too large, there is an economic case for imposing maximum 
rather than minimum tax rates.  
To our knowledge, the only previous study that provides empirical calculations of the 
welfare effects of fiscal competition is Wildasin 1989. He estimates that the welfare losses from 
property tax competition in the United States could be sizeable under some parameter scenarios. 
This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects of tax competition using a model 
that generalizes Wildasin 1989 in several important respects. In particular, we allow for a non-
zero aggregate supply elasticity for capital, we consider the effects of Leviathan behavior, we 
allow for monopsony power in capital markets, and we examine strategic behavior by 
governments. 
Our purpose is to quantify the welfare effects of fiscal competition over wide ranges of 
plausible values for the key parameters, using a fairly standard model of tax competition from 
the literature. The key parameters are the tax elasticity of demand for capital, the supply 
elasticity of capital, the demand elasticity for public goods, the respective weights attached to 
Leviathan and welfare-maximizing behavior by governments, and parameters summarizing the 
effects of monopsony power and strategic behavior. We illustrate under what combinations of 
parameter values there are significant welfare costs from taxes being too low, when there are 
significant welfare costs from taxes being too high, and when taxes could be too high or too low 
but the welfare effects are empirically small. 
The next section develops our basic, welfare-maximizing model, incorporating the fiscal 
externality and allowing for a non-zero supply elasticity for capital. Here we show that the 
welfare costs from the fiscal externality can be significant we call the welfare costs significant 
when they exceed 3% of capital tax revenues but only under fairly special conditions, when the 
tax elasticity of demand for capital has a relatively high value and the supply curve for capital is 
inelastic. The welfare losses are modest or quite small in magnitude (3% of capital tax revenues) 
when the tax elasticity has a low value or the capital supply elasticity is around unity. 
In Section 3 we assume that the government attaches a weight of π  to revenue 
maximization (Leviathan behavior) and a weight of 1 −  π  to welfare maximization. The critical 
values for π , at which point Leviathan behavior exactly offsets the fiscal externality, leaving Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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government spending and taxation at socially optimal levels in the local outcome, lie anywhere 
between 0 and about 0.6 (above these critical values the public sector is excessive). In fact, the 
welfare losses from the fiscal externality can fall substantially even when the government 
maximizes welfare 85% of the time (and maximizes revenue 15% of the time).  
Section 4 introduces monopsony power and strategic behavior. The key point here is that 
when a region increases its capital tax, it anticipates some fall in the after-tax return to capital, 
either directly because it has some monopsony power, or indirectly because it expects other 
regions to respond by raising their taxes. The fall in the after-tax return limits the expected 
capital outflow to the region, and therefore it is locally optimal to set a higher tax rate. Under 
plausible parameter scenarios, this effect further reduces the welfare losses from the fiscal 
externality by a notable amount. This section also shows that when we attach some weight to 
Leviathan behavior there is a very wide range of parameter scenarios under which taxation can 
be too high or too low, but the welfare effects are empirically small (less than 3% of capital tax 
revenues). 
The general message of the paper, summarized in Section 5, is that the welfare losses 
from capital tax competition seem to be fairly modest or quite small in magnitude (aside from 
some special cases). Thus the results appear to cast some doubt, for example, on the economic 
case for harmonizing capital taxes across the EU. However, Section 5 also notes some 
complicating factors that are omitted from the analysis, some of which would strengthen our 
findings, and others that might weaken them. 
2. The Basic Model and Initial Results 
A. Model Assumptions 5 
Consider a static model with a bloc of N homogeneous regions representing, for example, 
countries in the EU or states in the United States. The government of each region taxes a 
                                                 
5 The model described in this section is similar to the standard tax competition model presented in Wildasin 1989 
and Wilson 1999 (pp. 273–276). However, it generalizes those models by incorporating a non-zero aggregate supply 
elasticity for capital.  Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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perfectly mobile factor of production, capital, to finance public spending. Capital benefits the 
residents of a region by increasing labor productivity and hence wages. We assume that the 
population and labor force of each region is fixed, and there is no tax on labor.6  
The amount of capital in a region is denoted k, and the value of output is  ) (k f , where 
variables are defined in per capita terms. In equilibrium, the net of tax rate of return on capital, r, 
is equated across regions, because capital is perfectly mobile. Each government imposes a tax of 
t per unit on capital. In equilibrium: 
(2.1) t r k f + = ′ ) () ( t r k k + = ⇒  
That is, (competitive) firms in each region employ capital until the marginal value 
product of capital equals the gross cost of capital, which equals the return that must be paid to 
owners of capital plus the tax rate. We assume that r is unaffected by the tax policies of any 
individual region (this is relaxed in Section 4). 
The benefit to a region in terms of higher labor income from having an amount of capital 
k is: 
(2.2) k t r k f ) ( ) ( + −  
f(k) is the total income generated from capital, rk is the compensation paid to owners of capital, 
and tk is taxes paid to the government. Because individual regions take the net return on capital 
as given, tax revenues come entirely at the expense of surplus to labor/domestic residents. The 
tax causes capital to fall from k* in Figure 1 to k
p, and the welfare cost of the tax from the 
perspective of the individual region is the shaded triangle. 
Each government spends g per capita on public goods (defense, schools, welfare, roads, 
etc.). For simplicity we assume that the benefits of this spending, denoted  ) (g b , accrue only to 
local residents and not to firms or residents in other regions. Government spending must equal 
tax revenue, thus: 
(2.3) tk g =  
                                                 
6 These are standard simplifying assumptions in the literature. Wilson 1999 (pp. 282− 286), discusses the 
implications of allowing for labor taxes and labor mobility. Lee 1997 discusses the intermediate case of imperfect 
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Finally, we assume that the aggregate supply of capital for the region bloc is 
) (r K K S S = where 0 ) ( ≥ ′ r KS . An increase in the net of tax return on capital in the region bloc 
may increase the supply of capital by increasing savings.7 Figure 2 shows the capital market for 
the region bloc [the demand curve is the aggregation of the  ) (k f ′  curves across the n regions]. 
The equilibrium quantity of capital is 
p p nk K = , and the welfare cost from the bloc perspective 
of a uniform tax of t across all regions is the shaded triangle. This triangle is smaller than the 
summation of the shaded triangles in Figure 1 across the n regions, if the aggregate capital 
supply curve is upward sloping rather than flat. 
B. Policy Outcomes 
(i) Local Outcome. For the moment, we assume that each government maximizes the 
welfare of its citizens. The local outcome, when governments ignore the benefits of capital flight 





















(superscript p denotes a value in the local, or private, outcome). 
Equation (2.4) equates the marginal benefit from public spending with the marginal cost 
to domestic residents from raising an additional dollar of revenue. The marginal cost equals the 
dollar plus the marginal excess burden of taxation from an individual region’s perspective, 
defined in (2.5). The numerator in (2.5) is the welfare loss to the region from an incremental 
                                                                                                                                                             
capital mobility. 
7 More generally, a higher r could also attract more capital from regions outside the bloc. However, allowing for this 
would introduce the possibility that taxes at the bloc level are in part borne by foreign suppliers. This may raise the 
socially optimal level of taxation for the bloc, but it would also introduce the possibility of retaliation by 
governments outside the bloc. Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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increase in the tax rate, or the increase in the shaded triangle in Figure 1. It equals the tax rate 
times the incremental reduction in capital for the region. The denominator in (2.5) is marginal 
revenue from increasing the tax rate, equal to  t tk ∂ ∂ / ) ( . Thus, the marginal excess burden is the 
welfare cost per dollar of extra revenue raised.  

















− = η  
kt η  is the tax elasticity of demand for capital, expressed as a positive number. It shows 
the percentage change in the demand for capital in a region in response to a 1% increase in the 
tax rate when there is no change in r or the tax rates of other regions (
p
kt η  will denote the tax 
elasticity evaluated at the local outcome).  kt η  is larger the higher the tax rate and the greater the 
proportionate reduction in capital in response to higher taxes.  
Figure 3 shows the privately optimal amount of public spending g
p, where  ) (g b′  
intersects the marginal cost curve from a region’s perspective, equal to 1 + MEBR. Note that the 
marginal cost curve is convex because MEBR increases by more than in proportion to 
government spending.8 The curve becomes vertical at g
max in Figure 3 when  kt η is one and MEBR 
becomes infinite: This point corresponds to the peak of the Laffer curve.9  
(ii) Social Optimum. The social optimum defines the amount of public spending/level of 
taxation common to all regions that maximizes aggregate welfare for the region bloc. Aggregate 
welfare is the benefits from public spending, plus the area between the demand and supply 
curves in Figure 3 between the origin and the quantity of capital, after netting out tax payments 
(tK ). The condition for the social optimum is (see Appendix):  
                                                 
8 From (2.3), since  dt dk / < 0, an increase in government spending requires a more than proportionate increase in t. 
From (2.6), an increase in t leads to a more than proportionate increase in MEBR (at least for the cases when either 
dk/dt or  kt η  are constant).  









































K r KS KS / ′ = ε  is the capital supply elasticity with respect to the net of tax return on 
capital (superscript s denotes a value in the social optimum), and MEBB is the marginal excess 
burden of taxation from the region bloc perspective. 
Suppose the supply of capital is perfectly inelastic ( KS ε =0). In this case  1 − = ′ r  and 
0 = B MEB . The other extreme is when the supply of capital is perfectly elastic ( ∞ = KS ε ). In 
this case  0 = ′ r  and  R B MEB MEB = . Therefore in general, the marginal excess burden of 
taxation from the region bloc perspective is positive but less than the marginal excess burden of 
taxation from the individual region perspective. This is because at the bloc level, a higher tax 
will depress the net return on capital, thereby limiting the increase in the gross return on capital r 
+ t and hence limiting the reduction in demand for capital.  
This means that the marginal social cost of public spending for a region is less than 
R MEB + 1  in Figure 3, and the socially optimal amount of public spending, g
s, exceeds g
p. The 
shaded triangle in Figure 3 is the welfare loss from suboptimal government spending in the local 
outcome it equals the gap between  ) (g b′  and  B MEB + 1 , integrated between g
p and g
s. Put 
another way, the local amount of public spending/taxation is lower than the socially optimal 
levels due to a fiscal externality: individual regions do not take account of the efficiency benefits 
of capital flight to other regions within the bloc when choosing their tax rates (see, e.g., Wildasin 
1989 for more discussion). 
(iii) The Welfare Cost of the Fiscal Externality. To calculate welfare effects, we need to 
specify functional forms for  f ′  and b′ . For simplicity, we assume that both these curves are 
linear over the relevant range; the former assumption, along with (2.1), also implies that  t k ∂ ∂ /  
is constant. Therefore: Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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(2.9) {} ) 1 ~ ( 1 ) ( ) ( − − = −
∂
∂






p p p η  
where 
p t t t / ~ =  is a given tax rate expressed relative to t
p. In addition, we define the 


















(b′  is the shadow price of public spending).  
The empirical literature provides estimates of parameters in the local outcome, such as 
p
kt η  and 
p
G η , but not estimates of parameters in the socially optimal outcome, since the former is 
the observed, existing equilibrium and the latter outcome is not observed. Therefore, we need to 
obtain solutions for t
s, g
s, and the welfare loss, in terms of parameters in the local outcome. 
Despite our assumptions that  f ′  and b′ are linear, the  B MEB + 1  curve in Figure 3 is still 
nonlinear (MEBB is convex in government spending). This means that we cannot obtain explicit 
analytical solutions for t
s and g
s. However, it is straightforward to obtain two equations that can 
easily be solved numerically for t
s and g
s. 
First, socially optimal public spending, expressed relative to locally optimal spending, 
p s s g g g / ~ = , equals 
p p s s k t k t / . Using (2.9) gives: 
(2.11) {} ) 1 ~ ( 1 ~ ~ − − =
s p
kt
s s t t g η  
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Evaluating these expressions at the social optimum, and substituting into the optimality 
condition (2.7), gives a second equation in 
s g ~  and 
s t ~ . Using the resulting equation, and (2.11), 
we can solve numerically to obtain 
s g ~  and 
s t ~  as functions of 
p
kt η , 
p
G η , 
p
KS ε , and 
p p r t / . Finally, 
the shaded welfare cost triangle in Figure 3, when expressed relative to g
p, is defined by:  Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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This can be computed using the expressions for  ) (g b′  and  B MEB  from (2.8) and (2.12). 
 
C. Initial Empirical Results 
(i) Parameter Values. In our model, 
p
kt η  could be anywhere between 0 and one, and for 
completeness this is the range we consider. 
p
kt η  cannot exceed unity, because this would imply 
that regional economies were on the downward sloping part of the Laffer curve, in which case 
cutting taxes would both reduce deadweight loss and raise more revenue.10 Based on the 
empirical evidence, a range of about 0.1 to 0.6 seems the most plausible.11 From (2.6), this 
narrower range of values would imply a marginal excess burden of taxation from a local 
perspective of between 0.11 and 1.5.  
There is also considerable uncertainty over the elasticity of capital supply for the United 
States and for the EU. We consider a range of between 0 and 1 for 
p
KS ε  (see, e.g., the discussion 
in Ballard et al. 1985, p. 131). Larger values might be plausible, and would imply a smaller 
welfare loss from the fiscal externality, but this is not a major concern given that our purpose is 
mainly to put an upper bound on the welfare cost.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the demand for public goods is fairly inelastic (e.g., 
Rubinfeld 1987; Oates 1996a);12 based on the literature, we use values of 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 for the 
                                                 
10 In practice, 
p
kt η  could exceed one if, for example, policy makers are unaware that they are on the wrong side of 
the Laffer curve. Our model rules out this possibility because we assume governments are perfectly informed about 
parameter values. Note that the elasticity of demand for capital with respect to the gross price of capital (r + t) could 
exceed one, because this elasticity is greater than the capital elasticity with respect to the tax rate only (t). 
11 See Bartik 1991, p. 43. The empirical estimates are for competition between different state governments or 
governments in different metropolitan areas of the United States.  
12 Perhaps this is because the marginal benefit from additional provision of public services (road infrastructure, 




G η . Finally, we consider a range of 0.2 to 0.6 for the capital tax rate (
p p r t / ) 
based on estimates for the United States and other industrial countries (e.g., Judd 1987, p. 695; 
Mendoza et al. 1994, Table 3). 
For purposes of discussion we will say that the welfare cost of the fiscal externality is 
“significant” if it exceeds 3% of public spending/capital tax revenue. In practice this corresponds 
to around 0.15% to 0.45% of a region’s GDP.13 This threshold is probably conservative; 
however, it makes the main result from our paper that the welfare cost of the fiscal externality 
is generally not significant conservative. Note that the substantial uncertainty over parameter 
values is not a major problem if the welfare cost turns out to be insignificant over wide ranges of 
parameter scenarios.  
(ii) Results. The upper three panels in Figure 4 show the welfare cost of the fiscal 
externality, expressed relative to the (existing) locally optimal level of capital tax revenue. The 
lower three panels show the percentage difference between g
s and g
p. On the horizontal axes in 
each panel, we vary the capital tax elasticity (evaluated at g
p) between 0 and unity, and the lower, 
middle, and upper curves in each panel correspond to when the public goods demand elasticity is 
0.2, 0.4, and 0.6, respectively. Panels (a), (b), and (c) correspond to different scenarios for the 
capital supply elasticity and capital tax rate (see below).  
In panel (a) we set the capital supply elasticity equal to zero, thus  1 − = ′ r  and there is no 
reduction in the equilibrium quantity of capital when all tax rates are increased across the bloc. 
Clearly there is a range of parameter scenarios for which the welfare cost of the fiscal externality 
is significant above 3% of capital tax revenues. Roughly speaking, this is when the tax 
elasticity is between approximately 0.3 and 0.9. However, it is certainly plausible that the tax 
elasticity is less than 0.3, in which case the welfare losses can be modest or quite small in 
magnitude (less than 3% of tax revenues). Note that the welfare loss is zero in the extreme cases 
                                                 
13 Assume capital income is 25% of GDP and multiply by our range for the capital tax rate and by 0.03. For 
comparison, Harberger (1954) once estimated that the welfare costs from monopoly pricing in product markets in 
the United States amount to about 0.1% of GDP, which is regarded as a “small” number. Lucas (1990) estimated 
that the welfare gains from eliminating all taxes on capital and replacing the revenues from higher labor taxes would 
amount to about 1% of GDP, which is regarded as a fairly substantial welfare gain. Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
  12
when the tax elasticity is zero (increasing taxes at the region level has no effect on the demand 
for capital) and one (tax revenues are at their maximum amount in the local outcome, the peak of 
the Laffer curve). Between these cases the welfare loss rises to a maximum of 10% of tax 
revenue when 
p
G η  is 0.6, or a maximum of 7% of tax revenues when 
p
G η  is 0.2.14 The optimum 
increase in public spending is anything between 0 and 23%, under different scenarios for 
p
kt η  and 
p
G η  (lower left panel).15 
In panel (b) we assume that the capital supply elasticity is 0.5 and 
p p r t /  = 0.2. Using 
(2.8), this implies that, when 
p
kt η  is above 0.2, about 10− 30% of a tax increase across the bloc 
would be reflected in a higher gross cost of capital (70− 90% is still reflected in a lower r).16 
Comparing the top panels (a) and (b), we see that the welfare cost of the fiscal externality falls 
by roughly 25%, and the range of values for the capital tax elasticity for which the welfare cost is 
above our threshold of 3% narrows somewhat. In panel (c) we assume the capital supply 
elasticity is 1 and 
p p r t /  = 0.6. In this case, around 50% or more of a coordinated tax increase is 
passed on in a higher gross cost of capital (50% or less is reflected in a lower r), which greatly 
reduces the optimal size of the public sector (relative to when 
p
KS ε  = 0). The range of values of 
the capital tax elasticity for which the welfare cost is above 3% shrinks to about 0.5 to 0.85, and 
the upper bound for the welfare cost is about 6% of tax revenues. In this case, the optimal 
increase in public spending is between 0 and 10% (lower right panel). 
Summing up our initial results, the welfare cost of the fiscal externality may be 
significant under some plausible parameter values, but it can easily be small under others. For 
the welfare cost to exceed 3% of capital tax revenue, the capital tax elasticity has to be in the 
                                                 
14  The larger the public goods demand elasticity, the flatter the  ) (g b′  curve in Figure 3 (the benefits from 
additional public spending diminish at a slower rate). This implies a larger 
s g ~  and welfare loss from the fiscal 
externality.  
15 The results from panel (a) are roughly consistent with earlier calculations by Wildasin (1989), who assumed a 
vertical capital supply curve. 
16 When 
p
kt η  is below 0.2, a much higher portion can be passed on in a higher gross cost, because the aggregate 
demand for capital is inelastic relative to the aggregate supply curve.  Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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upper half of the plausible range noted above (0.1− 0.6), and the capital supply elasticity must not 
be “too large.” 
3. Alternative Assumptions about Government Behavior  
One assumption in the above model that is sometimes criticized in the literature is that 
governments seek to maximize social welfare. In particular, the public choice school views the 
government as, at least in part, a Leviathan seeking to maximize tax revenues for spending 
purposes.17 On the other hand, the welfare-maximizing view of government receives some 
theoretical support from the median voter theorem, at least when preferences are symmetric or 
residents of a region are fairly homogeneous (Bergstrom 1979). In this section we assume that 
government behavior is partly the result of revenue maximization and partly the result of welfare 
maximization.18  
A. Model Solution 
We now assume that the government attaches a weight of π  to maximizing revenues and 
a weight of  π − 1 to maximizing the welfare of its citizens. In this case the local outcome is 
defined by (see Appendix): 
(3.1) ) 1 )( 1 ( ) (
p
R
p MEB g b + − = ′ π
max g g
p ≤  
Compared with (2.4), governments now attach a weight of  π − 1  to the local marginal 
private costs of public spending. Note that g
p can never exceed g
max in Figure 3, the maximum 
amount of public spending allowed by the Laffer curve. The local marginal cost,  R MEB + 1,  
                                                 
17 See, for example, Brennan and Buchanen (1980), Edwards and Keen (1996), and Rauscher (1998). It is difficult 
empirically to judge whether the welfare maximizing or the Leviathan view of government is the more accurate, 
because both views predict that an increase in the number of competing governments should reduce public spending 
and taxation (see Oates 1989 for more discussion). 
Another strand of the public choice school views politicians as redistributing rents among competing 
pressure groups in order to maximize political support (e.g., Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; and Becker 1983). 
Introducing competition among interest groups would substantially complicate our analysis and might be difficult to 
implement empirically.  
18 Other political economy models (e.g., Edwards and Keen 1996; Rauscher 1998) also assume governments are 
concerned partly with maximizing social welfare and partly with maximizing tax revenues. Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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becomes infinity at g
max in Figure 3; therefore  π − 1  times the local marginal cost must also be 
infinity.19  
Maximizing welfare from the region bloc perspective still yields the same first-order 
condition as in (2.7). In theory, government spending in the local outcome can now be below or 
above the socially optimal amount. We define π  as the critical value of π  such that g
p = g
s. This 












































) 1 ( 1 ′ + −
′ −
=  
If π  is greater (less) than π , then g
p is greater (less) than g
s. 
Using (2.8) and (3.3), Table 1 shows the values of π  for selected values of  kt η ,  KS ε , and 
r t / . When the tax elasticity is 0.2, the critical values of π  lie between 0.06 and 0.2. In other 
words, if the government attaches a weight of more than 0.2 to revenue maximization (and a 
weight of less than 0.8 to welfare maximization), then public spending exceeds the socially 
optimal amount. But if the tax elasticity is 0.8, then public spending in the local outcome is 
excessive only if the weight attached to Leviathan behavior exceeds 0.7− 0.8. Thus, whether the 
public sector is too large or too small crucially depends on the size of the tax elasticity. 
Intuitively, the larger the tax elasticity, the larger the gap between the  R MEB + 1  curve and the 
B MEB + 1  curve in Figure 3 (when π  = 0), and hence the larger the value of π  necessary for 
) 1 )( 1 (
p
R MEB + − π  to be less than 
p
B MEB + 1 . Note that there is likely to be some correlation 
between the tax elasticity and π : because  kt η =1 is the pure revenue-maximizing Leviathan 
                                                 
19 Government spending may equal g
max, even if π  is less than one and even if some weight is attached to welfare 
maximization.  Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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outcome (π  =1), an observed value for 
p
kt η  closer to one suggests a higher weight attached to 
Leviathan behavior.  
B. Welfare Calculations 
Figure 5 illustrates the welfare effects (see Appendix for details on these calculations). 
The top panels show welfare costs due to government spending differing from the optimal level 
(again, welfare costs are a percentage of capital tax revenue), and the bottom panels show the 
percentage difference between g
s and g
p. Along the horizontal axis we vary the weight attached 
to Leviathan behavior between 0 and 0.6.20 In panel (a) we choose the values for 
p
G η  and 
p
KS ε  
that maximize the welfare cost from the fiscal externality (
p
G η =0.6, 
p
KS ε = 0); in panel (b) we 
choose intermediate values (
p
G η =0.4, 
p
KS ε = 0.5); and in panel (c) we use values that imply the 
smallest welfare cost from the fiscal externality (
p
G η =0.2, 
p
KS ε = 1).21 There are a number of 
noteworthy points from Figure 5. 
First, as we increase π , g
p approaches g
s and the welfare cost of the fiscal externality 
declines. At some critical value for π , g
p equals g
s, and the welfare costs and the optimal change 
in public spending are zero. Beyond this point, the welfare costs rise because public spending is 
excessive in the local outcome, and the optimal change in public spending becomes negative. 
The critical values for π , at which point Leviathan behavior exactly offsets the fiscal externality, 
lie anywhere between about 0 and 0.6. 
Second, the magnitude of the welfare cost from the fiscal externality is sensitive to even 
fairly small values for π . For example, when the tax elasticity is 0.35, the welfare cost falls from 
5.5% of government spending to 2.1% in panel (a) as we increase π  from 0 to 0.15; in panel (b) 
the welfare cost falls from 2.5% to 0.7% of government spending. In other words, even attaching 
                                                 
20 We ignore cases when π  takes a very high value and the tax elasticity a very low value, because these cases 
appear inconsistent.  
21 The intercepts of the curves in Figure 5 correspond to various points in Figure 4. For example, in the top of panel 
(a), the curve with triangles has an intercept of 5.5. This corresponds to the point on the upper curve in the top panel 
of Figure 4(a), when the tax elasticity is 0.35. Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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a weight of 0.15 to Leviathan behavior (and 0.85 to welfare maximizing behavior) can 
substantially reduce the welfare costs from the fiscal externality. If π  exceeds about 0.3, the 
welfare cost of the fiscal externality is not significant (i.e., it is below 3% of capital tax revenue) 
for all the parameter scenarios in Figure 5. 
Third, there are some cases when public spending is excessive, and the resulting welfare 
costs are empirically significant; however, these cases are fairly limited. For example, when the 
tax elasticity is 0.6, the welfare losses from excessive public spending (when the curves in the 
upper panels are upward sloping) are always well below 3%. When the tax elasticity is 0.35, π  
has to be above about 0.5 for the welfare losses to exceed 3% of tax revenue. 
Therefore the final point is that we are left with a wide range of outcomes under which 
public spending/capital taxation is either too low or too high, but the resulting welfare costs are 
not empirically large.  
4. Monopsony Power and Strategic Behavior 
We now make two extensions to the model of Section 2 that relax the assumption of 
perfectly competitive or “small” regional governments. First, we incorporate monopsony power 
in the capital market by individual regions. That is, when a region raises its tax rate, the net of 
tax return for the bloc as a whole falls, even when all other governments keep their tax rates 
constant. Second, we incorporate strategic behavior by assuming that other governments react to 
a tax increase in an individual region by also increasing their taxes. This effect also (indirectly) 
reduces the net return on capital. Thus, both of these effects dampen the increase in the gross 
cost of capital for an individual region, following an increase in the region’s tax rate. Section A 
examines the welfare-maximizing model and Section B incorporates Leviathan behavior. 
A. Model Solution with Welfare Maximization 
In this extended model, the local outcome when governments maximize welfare is now 























































In this case the marginal cost of public spending for an individual region is lower than in 
the model of Section 2 to the extent that  0 / < R dt dr  [see (2.4), (2.6), and (4.1)].  R dt dr /  is the 
effect on the net of tax return throughout the region bloc when an individual region increases its 
tax rate. Equation (4.2) expresses  R dt dr /  as the product of  dt dr / , the effect on the net return 
when all regions increase their tax rates by dt, and µ , where µ  has two components.  
The first component is 1/n, which reflects the degree of monopsony power. When one 
region incrementally increases its tax rate and no other regions respond, the effect on the average 
tax rate across the region bloc is 1/n times the region’s tax increase. The second component of µ  
reflects the response of the other n− 1 governments. If all other governments respond by raising 
their tax rates by  R R dt dt / − , the average tax rate across the region will be further increased by 
) / )( / ) 1 (( R R dt dt n n − − . Note that (so long as  1 / ≤ − R R dt dt ),  µ  cannot exceed one. Therefore, 
comparing (4.1) with (2.7), government spending and taxation in the local outcome cannot be 
socially excessive. Finally, note that  1 → n  implies  1 → µ  and 
s p g g → . That is, the fiscal 
externality disappears as the number of competing regions converges to one (Hoyt 1991). 
Table 2 shows calculations of µ  as we vary the number of regions between 2 and 20, and 
R R dt dt / −  between 0 and 0.5. In the first column there is no strategic behavior ( R R dt dt / − =0). 
Here the value of µ  varies between 0.05 and 0.5 as we vary the number of regions between 20 
and 2, reflecting the pure monopsony power effect. Incorporating strategic behavior can 
noticeably increase µ . For example, when n = 5, µ  increases from 0.2 to 0.44 when other Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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regions would respond to one region’s tax change by each changing their own taxes by 30% of 
the tax change (compare the first and third columns).22 Based on Table 2, we illustrate scenarios 
where the combined effect of monopsony power and strategic behavior imply values for µ  of 
between 0 and 0.5. 
B. Welfare Calculations 
Figure 6 shows how µ  affects the welfare cost of the fiscal externality (see Appendix for 
details on the welfare calculations). Along the horizontal axes we vary µ  between 0 and 0.5. In 
each panel, the lower, middle, and upper curves correspond to when the tax elasticity of demand 
for capital is 0.1, 0.35, and 0.6. In panels (a) and (c) we choose the demand elasticity for public 
goods and the capital supply elasticity to maximize and minimize the welfare cost of the fiscal 
externality, respectively, and in panel (b) we use intermediate values for these parameters. 
The main point here is simply that the welfare cost of the fiscal externality is sensitive to 
µ . For example, in panel (a) as we increase µ  from 0 to 0.2, the welfare cost of the fiscal 
externality falls from 9.1% to 5.4% of capital tax revenue when the tax elasticity is 0.6, and from 
5.7% to 3.3% when the tax elasticity is 0.35. Put another way, a positive µ  further restricts the 
range of scenarios under which the welfare cost of the fiscal externality exceeds 3% of tax 
revenues. 
C. Leviathan Behavior and Summary of Results 
Finally, we put together the extensions in Sections 3 and 4A. That is, we assume that 
each government attaches a weight of π  to revenue maximization and a weight of 1− π  to welfare 
maximization, taking into account its monopsony power and the reaction of other governments. 
For this case the local outcome is defined by (see Appendix): 
                                                 
22 In practice,  R R dt dt / _  and n are likely to be inversely related—the smaller the number of regions, the greater 
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In the case when  0 = π , the local outcome is the same as in the welfare-maximizing case 
[Equation (4.1)]. Allowing for a positive π  raises government spending and taxation in the local 
outcome relative to that in the socially optimal outcome. The rest of this section summarizes the 
combinations of parameter values under which the welfare costs of fiscal competition are and are 
not significant (see Appendix for more details on the welfare calculations).  
For given values of 
p
kt η , 
p
KS ε , 
p
G η , and µ , Table 3 indicates the values of π  below which 
the welfare cost of the fiscal externality exceeds 3% of capital tax revenues. “na” denotes a case 
where, even when the weight attached to Leviathan behavior is zero, the welfare cost of the fiscal 
externality is below 3% of tax revenues.  
In the first three columns we see that when the tax elasticity is 0.85, if µ  is 0.1 or 
greater, the welfare cost is never significant. If µ  = 0 (no monopsony power or strategic 
behavior), the welfare cost is not significant when the capital supply elasticity is unity. In 
addition, even when µ  = 0 and the capital supply elasticity is 0.5 or less, the welfare cost is 
significant only if the weight attached to Leviathan behavior is below 0.14− 0.17. 
In the middle three columns of Table 3, the tax elasticity is 0.6. When the supply 
elasticity is unity, the welfare cost is not significant when µ  is equal to or above 0.1, and when 
µ  = 0 it is not significant if the weight attached to Leviathan behavior is above 0.04 or 0.14. 
However, when the supply elasticity is 0.5 or less, there are some plausible cases when the 
welfare costs are significant. For example, when µ  = 0 they are significant so long as the weight 
attached to Leviathan behavior is not above 0.25− 0.39. 
In the last three columns, the tax elasticity is 0.35. Here the welfare cost is significant in 
only 2 out of 18 cases, and in no cases if π  exceeds 0.11. The welfare cost is never significant 
when the tax elasticity is 0.1. Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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Finally, Table 4 shows the minimum values of π  under which public spending/taxation is 
excessive that is, the effect of Leviathan behavior more than compensates for the fiscal 
externality and the welfare costs exceed 3% of capital tax revenues. In the first three columns, 
when the tax elasticity is 0.85, π  has to exceed 0.58− 0.91 for the welfare costs to be significant, 
for different values of µ , 
p
KS ε , and 
p
G η . When the tax elasticity is 0.6, π  has to be above 
0.46− 0.77 for the welfare costs to be significant, and when the tax elasticity is 0.35, π  has to be 
above 0.34− 0.62. In short, Table 4 shows that the weight attached to Leviathan behavior has to 
be fairly substantial for the welfare costs from excessive taxation to be significant.23 
To sum up, we have to make fairly special parameter assumptions in order for taxation to 
be too low and for the resulting welfare costs to be empirically significant in magnitude. But in 
addition, the parameter scenarios under which taxes are too high and the welfare costs are 
significant are also pretty limited. In short, there is a wide range of plausible parameter scenarios 
under which taxation could be either too high or too low, but the welfare effects are empirically 
small. 
5. Conclusions and Caveats 
This paper presents extensive calculations of the empirical magnitude of the welfare 
effects of capital tax competition among regional governments in a model that allows for 
welfare-maximizing and Leviathan behavior by governments, an upward sloping supply curve 
for capital, monopsony power for regional governments in the capital market, and strategic 
behavior among governments. The welfare costs from the fiscal externality that leads to 
suboptimal tax rates appear to be fairly modest (less than 3% of capital tax revenue) or quite 
small, aside from some special cases. Even these welfare costs may disappear quite quickly when 
some weight is attached to the possibility of Leviathan behavior, rather than assuming 
governments always maximize social welfare. The results therefore seem to cast some doubt on 
                                                 
23 Unfortunately, we do not have accurate estimates of π . However, as already mentioned, we can at least say that 
very high values for π  (i.e., fairly close to one) appear to be inconsistent with empirically estimated tax elasticities of 
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the economic case for setting minimum rates of capital taxes across a bloc of regions, such as the 
European Union, to mitigate fiscal externalities. 
The analysis omits several complicating factors, some of which would strengthen our 
findings, and others that might weaken them. For example, we make the common assumption 
that regions are homogeneous, and therefore we do not model the inefficiency due to the 
misallocation of capital when tax rates (and hence the marginal product of capital) differ across 
heterogeneous regions. Allowing for heterogeneity may increase the overall welfare losses from 
tax competition. But it may also greatly complicate the socially optimal set of tax rates across 
regions, since these must take into account different preferences for public spending and 
differences in key parameters such as the tax elasticity of demand for capital in each region. In 
addition, we do not consider other ways, beyond capital taxation, in which governments might 
compete for mobile factors, such as in the setting of environmental standards, welfare programs, 
or the provision of public inputs to improve the productivity of capital (e.g., Brown and Oates 
1987; Keen and Marchand 1997; Oates 1996b; Wilson 1996). The economic case for 
harmonization might be stronger for some of these policies, for example, measures to address 
pollution spillovers across regions.  
Finally, we use a static model, which is usual in the fiscal competition literature. 
However, more sophisticated welfare estimates might be obtained by using a dynamic 
optimization approach, which has been used in the literature on the efficiency costs of capital 
taxation (e.g., Judd 1987; Lucas 1990). Moreover, it might be useful to relax the assumption that 
capital is perfectly mobile by incorporating a cost function that depends on how quickly capital 
is moved across regions over time.22 
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Appendix: Analytical Derivations 
Section 2 
Deriving Eq. (2.4) 
Domestic welfare, W
p, expressed as a function of government parameters is: 
(A1) k t r k f g b g t W
p ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( + − + =  
This equals the benefits from public spending plus the surplus from capital net of taxes 







































where λ  is a Lagrange multiplier. From (A2) and (A3) we obtain (2.4). 
 
Deriving Eq. (2.7) 
Welfare from the region bloc perspective is: 
(B1) {} tk k f g b n g t W
s − + = ) ( ) ( ) , ( 
This is the expression in (A1) aggregated over n regions, except that we include income 
to savers nrk in the definition of social welfare. Thus we take account of the loss in surplus to 
















The government budget constraint aggregated for the region bloc is  ntk ng = . 









































and that  t k r k ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ / / . From (B2)-(B4), and using the definition of  kt η , we obtain 
(2.7). 
 






















) ( ) ( ) (
 

















+ ) ( ) (
 
since  t k t r d dk ∂ ∂ = + / ) ( / . In equilibrium  dt dK dt ndk S / / = , that is, the change in aggregate 
demand for capital must equal the change in supply. Noting that  ) / )( / ( / dt dr r K dt dK S S ∂ ∂ = , 



















= ε  
KS ε  is the supply elasticity for capital. Substituting (C2) and (C3) in (C1), and noting that in 
equilibrium  S K nk =  gives (2.8).  
 
Deriving Eq. (2.12) 
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Using (2.6) and (2.9): 
(D3)















η η  
To obtain an expression for r′ , note that, using (2.9): 
(D4)
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Deriving Eq. (3.1) 
The local optimization problem is to maximize: 
(E1) ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , ( g t W g t b g t W
p p
L π π − + =  
subject to the government budget constraint. When π  = 0, this is the same optimization 
problem as in Section 2. When π  = 1, the problem boils down to maximizing revenues, which 
yields 1 = kt η . Following the same procedure as in the derivation of (2.4) above, but using the 
objective function in (E1), yields (3.1). 
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To solve for 
s g ~  and 
s t ~  we again use equations (2.11), and (2.7), after substituting the 
expressions from (2.12). The only difference is that the expression for  ) (g b′  is now given by 







If an individual region increases its tax rate by dt, and other regions do not increase their 
taxes, this has the same effect on r as an increase in average rate of tax of all regions of dt/n. In 
addition, if an individual region expects all other governments to raise their tax rates by 
R R dt dt / − , this raises the (expected) average rate of tax across the bloc by  R R dt dt n n / ) / ) 1 (( − − . 





















Allowing for Leviathan behavior, the individual region has the same objective function as 
in (E1); however, it now takes into account the expected change in r according to (G1) when it 
















Following through the same derivation as before, we obtain (4.3), and setting π  = 0 gives 
(4.1) and (4.2). 
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To solve for 
s g ~  and 
s t ~  we again use equations (2.11) and (2.7), after substituting the 
expressions from (2.12). The only difference is that the expression for  ) (g b′  is now given by 
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Figure 4. The Welfare Cost of the Fiscal Externality 
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(a) public goods elasticity = 0.6, capital 










0 0.2 0.4 0.6
































(b) public goods elasticity =0.4, capital 
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(a) public goods elasticity = 0.6, capital 











































(b) public goods elasticity =0.4, capital 











































(c) public goods elasticity =0.2, capital 
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Table 1. Critical Values of ππππ  for which Public Spending Is Socially Optimal 
 
  kt η  
  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
KS ε  =0  0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 
KS ε  = 0.5, t/r =0.2  0.14 0.35 0.56 0.78 
KS ε  = 1, t/r =0.6  0.06 0.21 0.43 0.70 
Table 2. Illustrative Values for µµµµ  
 
R R dt dt / −    
n  0 0.1  0.3  0.5 
20  0.05 0.15 0.34 0.53 
10  0.10 0.19 0.37 0.55 
5  0.20 0.28 0.44 0.60 
2  0.50 0.55 0.65 0.75 Resources for the Future                                          Ian W.H. Parry 
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Table 3. Values for ππππ  below which the Welfare Cost from the Fiscal Externality Is Significant 
 
 
µ    
p
G η  
p
kt η =0.85 
p
KS ε =0 
p
kt η =0.85 
p
KS ε =0.5 
p
kt η =0.85 
p
KS ε =1 
p
kt η =0.6 
p
KS ε =0 
p
kt η =0.6 
p
KS ε =0.5 
p
kt η =0.6 
p
KS ε =1 
p
kt η =0.35 
p
KS ε =0 
p
kt η =0.35 
p
KS ε =0.5 
p
kt η =0.35 
p
KS ε =1 
0.2  0.16  0.14 na  0.30  0.25  0.04 na  na na  0 
0.6  0.17  0.15  na 0.39 0.33 0.14  0.11  na  na 
0.2 na na na  0.20  0.15  na na  na na  0.1 
0.6 na na na  0.29  0.25  na  0.06  na na 
0.2 na na na  na  na  na na  na na  0.3 
0.6 na na na  0.11  0.08  na na  na na 









G η  
p
kt η =0.85 
p
KS ε =0 
p
kt η =0.85 
p
KS ε =0.5 
p
kt η =0.85 
p
KS ε =1 
p
kt η =0.6 
p
KS ε =0 
p
kt η =0.6 
p
KS ε =0.5 
p
kt η =0.6 
p
KS ε =1 
p
kt η =0.35 
p
KS ε =0 
p
kt η =0.35 
p
KS ε =0.5 
p
kt η =0.35 
p
KS ε =1 
0.2  0.91 0.91 0.87  0.77 0.75 0.67 0.62 0.59 0.50  0 
0.6  0.89 0.88 0.85  0.71 0.69 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.40 
0.2  0.77 0.76 0.75  0.66 0.65 0.59 0.56 0.53 0.47  0.3 
0.6  0.71 0.70 0.70  0.58 0.56 0.52 0.45 0.42 0.36 
0.2  0.67 0.67 0.66  0.59 0.58 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.45  0.5 
0.6  0.58 0.59 0.60  0.49 0.48 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.34 
 